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ABSTRACT 
  
“An Empirical Assessment of the Employee Free Choice Act:  The 
Economic Implications” by Ann Layne-Farrar provides empirical evidence 
concerning the impact on the U.S. unemployment rate and employment-to-
population ratio should the highly controversial Employee Free Choice Act 
(EFCA) become law. The paper has received widespread public attention and its 
analysis is being used in the debate surrounding the EFCA.  This commentary 
raises three important questions about the empirical analysis: Are the predictions 
presented in the study, concerning the effects of the EFCA, realistic? Is the 
research design likely to identify the effects of the EFCA? Why do the data used 
in the analysis cover such a short time period? The discussion suggests the 
empirical results presented in Layne-Farrar (2009) should be viewed with 
considerable skepticism.   
 
 
OVERVIEW AND MOTIVATION 
 
n Empirical Assessment of the Employee Free Choice Act: The 
Economic Implications”, by Ann Layne-Farrar, was released on 
the Social Sciences Research Network as an unpublished working 
paper in March 2009.  The Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) proposes reforms 
to the National Labor Relations Act that would introduce a card check union 
recognition procedure, permit first contract arbitration and increase penalties for 
unfair labour practices.  This controversial legislation was passed by the House 
of Representatives in March 2007 and is now before the Senate.  Layne-Farrar 
(2009) provides empirical evidence that the implementation of the EFCA would 
increase the unemployment rate and decrease the employment-to-population 
ratio. Layne-Farrar’s testimony to the Senate Committee was based on this 
A 
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research.1  Results from the study have been cited in the media (for example, the 
Wall Street Journal,2 In These Times3).  Evidence from the report has been used 
by groups opposed to the EFCA4 to support their position (for example, the 
Chamber of Commerce5 and the National Association of Manufacturers6).   
Layne-Farrar (2009) is not published in an academic journal and therefore 
has not been subject to peer-review. When a paper is reviewed, two or three 
scholars, familiar with the area, evaluate the research and provide comments.  To 
ensure impartiality in the review process the author does not know the identity 
of the reviewers - in some cases reviewers also do not know the identity of the 
author. The editor of the journal uses the reviewers’ assessments (and the 
author’s response to them) to determine whether or not to publish the paper. The 
review process is an important component of the research cycle; it provides 
valuable feedback to the researcher and functions as a screen to ensure there are 
no major errors in the research. When a paper is accepted for publication in an 
academic journal it is a signal that the research is considered to be of acceptable 
quality. It is troubling that this paper by Layne–Farrar, which addresses an 
important and very controversial public policy issue and has received such 
widespread public attention, has not passed through a peer-review process 
particularly when the research has been funded by an interest group. 
 The purpose of these comments is to provide a critical evaluation of 
Layne-Farrar (2009).  This parallels the review process Layne-Farrar (2009) might 
have undergone.7 I focus on three questions concerning the empirical analysis. 
First, if we accept the empirical analysis at face value, are the predictions based 
on scenarios where lagged union density increases by 5 to 10 percentage points 
in a single year realistic? The answer is clearly “no” -- this means predictions 
based in these assumptions are of little interest.  Second, is the research design of 
the study likely to identify the impact of changes in the legal environment 
associated with the passage of the EFCA on the macroeconomic variables of 
interest?  The answer is “no” – the estimated coefficient on lagged density is 
unlikely to accurately reflect the impact of legislative change on the macro 
outcomes of interest. Therefore to interpret it as such and use it to make 
predictions concerning the impact of the EFCA is incorrect. Third, why do the 
data in the analysis cover such a short period of time? High quality data from 
Statistics Canada are readily available for all variables of interest to 2007 – more 
information is better than less, these data should be used in the analysis.  I begin 
by providing a summary of Layne-Farrar (2009).  I then proceed to discuss each 
question in turn. 
 
SUMMARY OF LAYNE-FARRAR (2009) 
  
The primary objective of Layne-Farrar (2009) [hereafter referred to as LF] 
is to provide empirical evidence concerning how changes in the legal 
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environment that would occur if the EFCA were passed are likely to affect the 
unemployment rate, the employment-to-population ratio and the net investment 
rate in the United States.  
 The first section of the paper describes the essential features of the Act 
and critiques three reasons proponents of the EFCA give for supporting the Act.  
The second section examines some literature on how unions affect the overall 
economy. The third section presents empirical evidence pertaining to the impact 
of the EFCA on the three macroeconomic variables of interest.  
Since these comments focus on the third section of the paper I describe 
the empirical methodology and results in more detail. The author argues that the 
introduction of card check and first contract arbitration (FCA), associated with 
passing the EFCA, would increase union density and that changes in union 
density can affect the unemployment rate, the employment-to-population ratio 
and net investment. The author also makes a case that evidence based on 
Canadian experience is relevant for informing U.S. policy decisions. The 
empirical analysis proceeds to estimate regressions, using Canadian data, which 
examine the relationship between lagged union density and the three 
macroeconomic variables of interest. The regression results are used to make 
predictions about how the introduction of the EFCA is likely to affect the U.S. 
unemployment rate and the U.S. employment-to-population ratio and the 
implications for the levels of unemployment and employment. 
The empirical analysis uses Canadian cross-sectional time-series data for 
ten provinces from 1976 to 1997. A number of control variables are included. The 
estimations are performed using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Random Effects 
(RE) and Fixed Effects (FE) estimation. Standard errors take into account 
heteroskedasticity and other error-relationships that may exist. The results show 
that lagged union density has a statistically significant positive effect on the 
unemployment rate, a statistically significant negative effect on the employment-
to-population ratio and no statistically significant effect on the net investment 
rate.  The author uses the results to predict the likely effect of a 5 percentage 
point or 10 percentage point increase in lagged union density (between 2007-
2008) on unemployment rates, unemployment, employment rates and 
employment in the U.S. in 2009 [Table 6 (pp. 28)].  The predictions indicate that 
for these changes in lagged union density there would be very substantial 
increases in the unemployment rate (1.49 to 3.53 percentage points) and very 
substantial decreases in the employment-to-population rate (.86 to 2.27 
percentage points) and corresponding detrimental effects on the levels of 
unemployment and job creation. The author recommends against passing the 
EFCA because of these effects. 
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ARE THE PREDICTIONS, BASED ON SCENARIOS WHERE UNION 
DENSITY INCREASES BY FIVE OR TEN PERCENTAGE POINTS IN A 
YEAR REALISTIC? 
 
It is likely that the introduction of a card check union recognition 
procedure will increase union density.  However it is unrealistic to expect that if 
the EFCA were passed union density would increase by 5 or 10 percentage 
points in one year.8    
   
EFCA is likely to Increase union density 
 
 There is consensus in the Canadian empirical literature (Martinello (2000), 
Johnson (2002), Riddell (2004), Slinn (2004)) that the type of union recognition 
procedure has a substantial, statistically significant influence on certification 
success.  Based on this evidence a change from mandatory votes to card check, as 
proposed in the EFCA,  is  likely to increase the probability that a union succeeds 
in obtaining certification and, as a result, union membership will increase and so 
too, union density.9 There is some evidence that a change from mandatory votes 
to card check increases application rates (Johnson (2004) pp.360); this also 
contributes to increasing union membership and density. One might argue that 
the introduction of First Contract Arbitration, by increasing the probability that a 
union achieves a first agreement, increases the expected benefits to unions (and 
bargaining unit members) of unionization and therefore could result in increased 
application rates.  There is no empirical evidence to support a link between FCA 
and application rates. Evidence that exists shows that FCA has no statistically 
significant impact on certification success rates (Johnson (2002) pp. 356).  
Therefore any effect on union density associated with the introduction of EFCA 
is more likely to operate through the introduction of card check rather than the 
introduction of FCA. 
 
Increases in Union Density of 5 or 10 percentage points in a short period of time are 
unrealistic 
 
 It is important to recognize that application rates and certification success 
rates affect the flow of union membership and the flow in any one year is very 
small relative to the existing stock of union members. Therefore in a short period 
of time increases in application or success rates (even if large in magnitude) do 
not have a substantial impact on union density. 10  However the accumulated 
affect of such changes on union density, over a long period of time can be 
considerable. 
Johnson (2004) presents simulations, based on Canadian experience, that 
examine how changes in union recognition procedures in Canada have affected 
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the Canada-U.S. union density gap. In particular simulations are presented that 
estimate what Canadian union density would have been if mandatory votes or if 
card check had been in effect in all jurisdictions from 1980 to 1998. The 
simulation analysis holds ‘all else constant’ so simulated density reflects only the 
difference in union recognition procedures.11 A comparison of these simulations 
isolates how differences in union recognition procedures affect union density.  
This comparison was not made in the Johnson (2004) because that paper was 
addressing a different research question.  The plot below shows simulated union 
density under each of the two recognition procedures.  The plot reveals that card 
check is associated with higher union density; the difference in union density is 
initially very small and grows over time. By 1998, under the assumption that each 
type of union recognition procedure has been in effect for 18 years, simulated union 
density under card check is 5.97 percentage points higher than simulated union 
density under mandatory votes.  
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Table 1 (below) shows the difference in union density between card check 
and mandatory vote simulations from 1980 to 1998 and how the difference in 
union density changes from year-to-year. The table reveals that the largest 
change in union density in any single year is .44 percentage points.  
Differences in labour law governing mandatory votes and unfair labour 
practices in Canada, compared to the changes proposed in the EFCA, mean that 
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these results, based on Canadian experience, likely underestimate the effect of a 
change from mandatory votes to card check on union density in the U.S. if the 
EFCA is passed.12  The simulation results show that the change in union density, 
associated with the difference in union recognition procedures, in any one year is 
never more than .44 percentage points.  Even if this were doubled, to take into 
account differences in labour law between the U.S. and Canada, the change in 
union density, would be less than 1 percentage point.  It is hard to imagine that 
U.S. union density would increase by 5 to 10 percentage points in a single year in 
a response to the introduction of the EFCA. 
 
Table 1: 
Difference in Simulated Union Density in Canada 1980 to 1998* 
 
Year Cards-Vote Difference from 
year-to year 
1980 .16 .16 
1981 .44 .28 
1982 .74 .30 
1983 1.02 .28 
1984 1.3 .28 
1985 1.65 .35 
1986 1.98 .33 
1987 2.28 .30 
1988 2.58 .30 
1989 2.93 .35 
1990 3.27 .34 
1991 3.71 .44 
1992 4.09 .38 
1993 4.46 .37 
1994 4.76 .30 
1995 5.02 .26 
1996 5.38 .36 
1997 5.69 .31 
1998 5.97 .28 
Total  5.97 
                  *Based on results from Johnson (2004). 
 
Most of the predictions of the impact on the unemployment rate and 
employment-to-population ratio presented in LF are based on scenarios where 
lagged union density increases by 5 or 10 percentage points in a single year.  In 
choosing these values Layne-Farrar refers to predictions made by; Friedman – 
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that in response to the EFCA union density would increase by at least 5 
percentage points, Sterne- that union membership would increase by 1.5 million 
each year for the next 10-15 years, and Carter and Lotke (2007) that union density 
would increase by 10 percentage points (LF, pp. 23).  None of these predictions 
suggest that union density would increase by 5 or 10 percentage points in a single 
year.  Sterne’s prediction implies that by 2018 union density would have risen to 
23% (based on Layne-Farrar’s calculations (LF, pp. 43-44)) -- an increase of 15 
percentage points over 10 years – on average 1.5 percentage points per year.  
Carter and Lotke’s (2007) prediction is based on Johnson (2004) and therefore 
refers to union density comparisons after union recognition procedures have 
been in place for 18 years. In these simulations the largest increase in union 
density in a single year is .44 percentage points. Friedman’s prediction does not 
specify a time frame.   
If the EFCA is passed the introduction of card check can be expected to 
increase union density.  However changes in union density occur slowly and any 
substantive increase in density would only be evident over a long period of time. 
Even if one accepts the author’s interpretation of the empirical results, 
predictions of the likely impact of the change in the legal environment associated 
with the introduction of EFCA on the U.S. unemployment rate and employment-
to-population ratio in 2009 based on scenarios where the EFCA causes union 
density in 2007-08 to increase by 5 to 10 percentage points are unrealistic and 
misleading. 
 
IS THE RESEARCH DESIGN ABLE TO IDENTIFY THE EFFECTS OF THE 
EFCA ON THE MACROECONOMIC OUTCOMES OF INTEREST?  
 
It is unlikely that the empirical analysis has succeeded in its stated goal of 
identifying the influence of changes in the legal environment associated with the 
introduction of EFCA (namely card check and first contract arbitration) on the 
macroeconomic variables of interest. 
The author assumes that the introduction of EFCA will increase union 
density (which, as discussed above, is quite likely).  Then lagged density is used 
as the key explanatory variable in order to measure the impact of changes in the 
EFCA ‘indirectly’ on each of the macroeconomic variables of interest. There are a 
number of serious problems with the analysis.   
  First, while as noted above, the legal environment may affect union 
density the link is not a rapid one.  On an annual basis one would expect that any 
effects of a change in the legal environment would be dwarfed by the myriad of 
other factors that also affect union density – some of these are mentioned in LF - 
structural changes, changing attitudes toward unions and ‘other’ changes in the 
economic environment (LF, pp. 5-7).    
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Second, many of the other factors that influence union density may also 
affect the macro variables of interest.  If these factors are left out of the analysis 
the coefficient on union density will be ‘biased’ -- the size/sign of the coefficient 
on union density will reflect not just the influence of the legislative environment 
but will also reflect the influence of these other factors.  In an attempt to address 
this issue the empirical analysis includes province fixed effects and year effects 
and other observable variables. Even so I am not convinced that establishing that 
a statistically significant relationship exists between lagged union density and 
the various macro outcomes isolates the impact of the legislative environment on 
those variables. The empirical analysis does not estimate specifications that 
include province-specific time trends.  Province-specific time trends capture 
unobserved factors that change gradually over time within a jurisdiction  such as 
structural change, attitudes towards unions, or ‘other economic factors’  that, as 
noted above, have been identified as potential explanations for changes in union 
density and may also influence the macroeconomic variables. 
 Given change in the legislative environment likely has a weak influence 
on union density, is only one of many factors that affect union density, and the 
estimated coefficient on lagged union density is likely to be contaminated by 
omitted variable bias I find it hard to believe that the estimated coefficient on 
lagged union density accurately reflects the influence of change in the legislative 
environment on the unemployment rate, the employment-to-population ratio or 
the net investment rate.  
Though not its stated goal, the results of this paper are also being used as 
evidence that increases in lagged union density have deleterious effects on 
unemployment and employment. Once again I am not convinced that the impact 
of lagged union density on these variables has been identified.  The presence of 
omitted variable bias means that estimating the relationship between lagged 
union density and the dependent variable(s) is not able to isolate the effect of 
changes in union density on the variables of interest. Demographic change and 
the change in industrial structure affect employment and unemployment directly 
and also affect union density.  These variables have not been adequately taken 
into account in the analysis.    
 
WHY DOES THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS USE DATA FOR A SUCH A 
SHORT PERIOD OF TIME? 
 
I do not understand why the analysis has been restricted to the period 
from 1976 to 1997 - the inclusion of lagged variables further restricts the number 
of years covered in some specifications.  LF claims data are not available past 
1997 (LF pp. 20, footnote 58).  However data on all variables used in the 
unemployment rate and employment-to-population rate regressions are readily 
available from Statistics Canada for a longer period that extends at least to 2007.13  
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Annual data on union membership by province are available from Perspectives on 
Labour and Income to 2008.14 It is odd that the data used in LF end in 1997. Data 
are not available from any source on union membership by province in 1996 – in 
order to extend the data to 1997 the author linearly extrapolates the data on 
union membership for both 1996 and 1997 (LF pp. 35)). Yet does not include the 
period from 1998 where data on union membership and other variables are 
available.15  It is unclear why so much information is excluded from the analysis.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In sum, the discussion of the three questions raises serious concerns about 
the empirical analysis presented in Layne-Farrar (2009).  First, even if the results 
are taken at face value (and the identification problem suggests this is not 
possible), the implications of the results for the unemployment rate and the 
employment-to-population ratio based on predictions of union density rising by 
5 to 10 percentage points in the period of a year are unrealistic and misleading.  
Second, a research design that relies on lagged union density to identify the 
impact of EFCA is unlikely to isolate the effect of legislative change on the 
unemployment rate or the employment-to-population ratio.  If this is the case, it 
is not possible to use the empirical results to make predictions concerning the 
likely impact of the EFCA on the macro variables of interest.  Finally, it is very 
puzzling that the analysis does not examine a longer period of time.  These issues 
suggest the empirical results in Layne-Farrar (2009) are at minimum questionable 
and are likely fundamentally flawed. Under these circumstances the results and 
their interpretation should be viewed with considerable skepticism. 
 
NOTES 
                                                 
∗   I would like to thank Mike Veall for reading these comments and providing valuable feedback. Any 
errors that remain or opinions expressed are the author's alone. 
1. The testimony was given to the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 
Hearing on Rebuilding Economic Security: Empowering Workers to Restore the Middle Class, March 
10, 2009, http://help.senate.gov/Hearings/2009_03_10/Layne-Farrar.pdf. 
2.   Kris Maher “Economists Debate Pro-Labor Measure.” Wall Street Journal, March 2, 2009 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123595413617305463.html 
3. Art Levine, “Shilling on the Corporate Dollar.” In these Times, May 31, 2009 
http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/4461/shilling_on_the_corporate_dollar/ 
4. The research itself is funded by the Alliance to Save Main Street Jobs a group with close ties to the 
business community. The Alliance includes the American Hotel and Lodging Association, the 
Associated Builders and Contractors, the International Council of Shopping Centers, the Real Estate 
Round Table, the Retail Industry Leaders Association and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.  
5.  http://www.chamberpost.com/2009/03/study---efca-would-eliminate-600000-jobs-in-2010.html 
6.  http://www.shopfloor.org/2009/06/09/card-check-600000/  
7.  These comments are limited to the empirical analysis and do not purport to provide a complete 
review of either the empirical analysis or the paper as a whole. 
8. Most predictions in LF are based on scenarios where union density is assumed to increase by 5 or 10 
percentage points in a single year.  Occasionally LF considers the case where union density increases 
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by 3 percentage points (see the abstract in Layne-Farrar (2009)). The simulation results presented 
below suggest that even an increase of one percentage point in union density (as a result of the 
introduction of card check) in a given year would be high. 
9. Assuming net union membership growth keeps pace with labour force growth. 
10. Especially when it is considered that union density is measured relative to some measure of the 
labour force. 
11.  More precisely the simulations are based on a union membership stock-flow growth accounting 
identity.  For each simulation the application rate and certification success rate is adjusted to reflect 
presence of either mandatory vote or card check. These rates are adjusted based on Johnson (2002) 
where the empirical results from two specifications are presented.  In Johnson (2004) simulations 
based on both specifications are estimated. For simplicity I present only simulation results from 
specification #2.Results based on specification #1 show that after 18 years simulated union density is 
4.24 percentage points higher under card check than under mandatory vote. These results are shown 
in the Appendix.  Other factors in the identity that affect union membership are fixed at their actual 
values in each year.  The results are slightly different from what can be inferred from Johnson (2004). 
12.  Mandatory votes in Canada occur under strict time limits between filing the application for 
certification and the vote (5-10 days depending on the jurisdiction).  This is not true in the U.S.  In 
Canada allegations of unfair labour practices are dealt with by the Labour Board in the jurisdiction 
and are rarely processed in the courts.  This means it is faster and less expensive to process such 
complaints in Canada compared to the U.S.  
13. I was unable to determine the time period over which the net investment rate analysis could be 
conducted. CANSIM series numbers are not provided in LF.  In general the variables and data in LF 
are not well documented.  For example, neither a precise definition of union density nor the data 
sources used to construct union density- the critical explanatory variable in the analysis- are provided 
(LF, pp. 35).  
14. Data on union membership by province for 2007 and 2008 are available from Perspectives on Labour 
and Income http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/75-001-x/pdf/topics/unionization2008.pdf (page 6) and 
can be backdated to 1987 (not including 1996) from this source.  Data prior to 1987 are available from 
the Corporations and Labour Unions Returns Act (CALURA).   
15. It should be noted that no consistent data on union membership by province exist from 1976 to 2008.  
Data are available from CALURA from 1976 to 1995 with a change in the definition of union 
membership in 1983.  Data from 1997 to 2008 are available from the Labour Force Survey (LFS). No 
data are available for 1996. If year effects are included in the analysis changes in the definition of 
union membership or data source can be taken into account. 
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Table A-1: 
Difference in Simulated Union Density in Canada  1980 to 1998* 
 
Year Cards-vote Difference 
1980 .12 .12 
1981 .34 .22 
1982 .56 .22 
1983 .76 .20 
1984 .97 .21 
1985 1.23 .26 
1986 1.47 .24 
1987 1.67 .20 
1988 1.9 .23 
1989 2.14 .24 
1990 2.38 .24 
1991 2.68 .3 
1992 2.95 .27 
1993 3.20 .25 
1994 3.41 .21 
1995 3.59 .18 
1996 3.85 .26 
1997 4.05 .20 
1998 4.24 .19 
Total  4.24 
                      *Based on Specification #1 from Johnson (2002, 2004) 
 
